Table of Contents

- 1. Executive Summary
- 2. Code review
 - 1. Review of the Specification
 - 2. Manual Review of Code
 - 3. Comparison to Specification
- 3. Testing and automated analysis
 - 1. Test Coverage Analysis
 - 2. Symbolic Execution (Automated Code Path Evaluation)
- 4. Itemized Recommendations & Best Practices Review

Executive Summary

Bramah Systems, LLC. was engaged by Set Protocol in early December of 2018 in order to conduct a security review of the Set Protocol smart contracts. This assessment was conducted over the course sixty person-hours.

The codebase under review (as provided by the Set Protocol team) represents a continuous body of work. This review pertains to the security posture of the Set Protocol as of commit hash <u>672e1de6f84d57eac9c2d97f9bc181c18ba75e82</u>. The scope of Bramah's engagement covered all relevant smart contracts contained within the "contracts" directory. Other elements contained within the <u>set-protocol-contracts</u> repository were not reviewed.

Both the Set Protocol specification and codebase indicate the usage of multiple third party libraries. Elements of the Kyber, Taker Wallet, and 0x V2 Protocols are utilized within the operations of the Set Protocol, with "exchange wrappers" serving as a conduit between the decentralized exchanges and the Set Protocol Core. As these third party libraries pose unique security impact, each is detailed within the following report and their interactions are noted.

Various methodologies of analysis were used throughout this review. In particular, manual code inspection and static analysis utilizing formal methods were applied. Dynamic analysis and fuzz testing were utilized during the course of analysis to aid discovery of vulnerabilities which would only become apparent during execution. Manual inspection was additionally used in cases of suspected false positives, confirming (or denying) the vulnerability suggested by the tooling.

Throughout the review, these tools are utilized in best-effort to attempt to unearth potential security vulnerabilities. This report is not a formal endorsement of these tools, the organizations that support them, or a testament to their accuracy. These tool sets were used at the discretion of the reviewers where deemed appropriate for use.

Code Review

Review of Specification

The Set Protocol specification (located <u>within the whitepaper</u>) details various facets of the Set Protocol implementation and how various contracts interact. Most importantly, a number of key aspects of the protocol are defined (within "Smart Contracts"), which operate as pillars for this review.

These smart contract definitions reflect various assumptions that the course of this review aimed to validate. For instance, in the case of *Vault*, a key assumption is that "*Vault's accounting*"

interfaces are only available to Core", validation of such is critical to the continued successful operation of the protocol.

Following the smart contract definitions exists "Variant ERC20 Standard Considerations", which similarly presents numerous objectives which must be satisfied (namely those pertaining to decimal differences between presently existing quantities of tokens and token pausability). These assumptions similarly present outsized security considerations, and were included within the scope of review. The Set Protocol itself includes functionality to avoid behavior with a potentially undefined impact to these considerations, namely the avoidance of accepting tokens with non-zero transfer fees and the presence of a "natural unit".

As Set Protocol notes throughout the document, many considerations discussed in the white paper are part of an evolving body of work, and may not inherently be reflected in the present version of the codebase. As a result of such, not all statements made in the whitepaper have been inherently tested in the scope of this review, and certain aspects of the specification could not be tested (e.g. Interest-Generating Sets).

Manual Code Inspection

Manual code inspection revealed extensive focus upon overall structure and readability of the codebase. All functionality is documented and possesses unit tests, with a near 1:1 ratio of code to comments.

Clear barriers are established to ensure the principle of least privilege is followed and secure by design guidelines are followed throughout.

The contract makes extensive usage of external libraries (created by OpenZeppelin, KyberNetwork, and 0x). This practice enables relatively minimal modifications to be made. Libraries ensure that low-hanging fruit often associated with typographical errors and simplistic oversights are removed.

Comparison to Specification

Multiple checks and constants are presented through the Truffle project to ensure intended actions are successfully performed. With extensive unit testing, each function has proper representation to validate it performs as specified within the whitepaper. Other than noted anomalies contained within itemized recommendations, Bramah found no deviations from the specification that would present security concerns.

Testing and Automated Analysis

Test Coverage Analysis

Symbolic Execution (Automated Code Path Evaluation)

Itemized Recommendations & Best Practices

Implicit Visibility Levels Set

In version 0.4.25 of Solidity, the default function visibility levels are as follows:

- 1. Contracts: Public
- 2. Interfaces: External
- 3. State Variables: Internal

In a contract, the fallback function can be external or public.

In an interface, all the functions should be declared as external.

Each function should have a defined function visibility to prevent confusion. A relevant mitigation strategy involves declaring a visibility level, removing any potential for ambiguity of the overall visibility of the function.

File: contracts/core/lib/auction-price-libraries/IAuctionPriceCurve.sol Line: 47 File: contracts/core/lib/auction-price-libraries/IAuctionPriceCurve.sol Line: 60 File: contracts/core/RebalancingSetToken.sol Line: 54 File: contracts/core/RebalancingSetToken.sol Line: 56 File: contracts/core/RebalancingSetToken.sol Line: 55 File: contracts/core/RebalancingSetToken.sol Line: 53 File: contracts/external/0x/AssetProxy/libs/LibAssetProxyErrors.sol Line: 34 File: contracts/external/0x/AssetProxy/libs/LibAssetProxyErrors.sol Line: 26 File: contracts/external/0x/AssetProxy/libs/LibAssetProxyErrors.sol Line: 33 File: contracts/external/0x/AssetProxy/libs/LibAssetProxyErrors.sol Line: 27 File: contracts/external/0x/AssetProxy/libs/LibAssetProxyErrors.sol Line: 30 File: contracts/external/0x/AssetProxy/libs/LibAssetProxyErrors.sol Line: 35 File: contracts/external/0x/AssetProxy/libs/LibAssetProxyErrors.sol Line: 28 File: contracts/external/0x/AssetProxy/libs/LibAssetProxyErrors.sol Line: 29 File: contracts/external/0x/Exchange/libs/LibEIP712.sol Line: 23 File: contracts/external/0x/Exchange/libs/LibEIP712.sol Line: 26 File: contracts/external/0x/Exchange/libs/LibEIP712.sol Line: 29 File: contracts/external/0x/Exchange/libs/LibOrder.sol Line: 28 File: contracts/external/0x/Exchange/libs/LibExchangeErrors.sol Line: 26 File: contracts/external/0x/Exchange/libs/LibExchangeErrors.sol Line: 58 File: contracts/external/0x/Exchange/libs/LibExchangeErrors.sol Line: 52 File: contracts/external/0x/Exchange/libs/LibExchangeErrors.sol Line: 28 File: contracts/external/0x/Exchange/libs/LibExchangeErrors.sol Line: 61 File: contracts/external/0x/Exchange/libs/LibExchangeErrors.sol Line: 48 File: contracts/external/0x/Exchange/libs/LibExchangeErrors.sol Line: 38

File: contracts/external/0x/Exchange/libs/LibExchangeErrors.sol Line: 51 File: contracts/external/0x/Exchange/libs/LibExchangeErrors.sol Line: 62 File: contracts/external/0x/Exchange/libs/LibExchangeErrors.sol Line: 30 File: contracts/external/0x/Exchange/libs/LibExchangeErrors.sol Line: 29 File: contracts/external/0x/Exchange/libs/LibExchangeErrors.sol Line: 68 File: contracts/external/0x/Exchange/libs/LibExchangeErrors.sol Line: 57 File: contracts/external/0x/Exchange/libs/LibExchangeErrors.sol Line: 33 File: contracts/external/0x/Exchange/libs/LibExchangeErrors.sol Line: 54 File: contracts/external/0x/Exchange/libs/LibExchangeErrors.sol Line: 27 File: contracts/external/0x/Exchange/libs/LibExchangeErrors.sol Line: 45 File: contracts/external/0x/Exchange/libs/LibExchangeErrors.sol Line: 39 File: contracts/external/0x/Exchange/libs/LibExchangeErrors.sol Line: 65 File: contracts/external/0x/Exchange/libs/LibExchangeErrors.sol Line: 66 File: contracts/external/0x/Exchange/libs/LibExchangeErrors.sol Line: 37 File: contracts/external/0x/Exchange/libs/LibExchangeErrors.sol Line: 42 File: contracts/external/0x/Exchange/libs/LibExchangeErrors.sol Line: 67 File: contracts/external/0x/Exchange/libs/LibExchangeErrors.sol Line: 34 File: contracts/external/0x/Exchange/libs/LibExchangeErrors.sol Line: 53 File: contracts/mocks/tokens/NoXferReturnTokenMock.sol Line: 10 File: contracts/mocks/tokens/InvalidReturnTokenMock.sol Line: 9 ## Unsafe Array Length Manipulation

If possible, one should changing the length of the dynamic array directly. Large array lengths can lead to storage collisions and potentially modification of data outside the confines of the array. Multiple mitigation strategies, documented below, are capable of being used to remediate this.

1. Use uint[] storage arrayName = new uint[](7) to create a new array of the desired length.

- 2. Use delete arrayName to clear a dynamic array.
- 3. Use .push() (instead of .length++) to write to the end of the array.

4. Use .pop() (instead of .length--) to delete the last element of the dynamic array. ## Multiplication After Division

Solidity operates only with integers. Thus, if the division is done before the multiplication, the rounding errors can increase dramatically. Mitigation should take place in the form of multiplication prior to division.

File: contracts/core/RebalancingSetToken.sol Line: 886

File: contracts/core/RebalancingSetToken.sol Line: 874

File: contracts/core/RebalancingSetToken.sol Line: 473

File: contracts/core/RebalancingSetToken.sol Line: 840

ERC 20 "Approve" Function Usage

As the Set Protocol team makes clear within their comments, one should only use the approve function of the ERC-20 standard to change allowed amount to 0 or from 0, having validated the transaction has been successfully mined. Relevant mitigation includes using approval and allowance steps, and remains largely contested in the overall Ethereum space. File: contracts/mocks/lib/ERC20WrapperMock.sol Lines: 20-28 File: contracts/mocks/tokens/NoXferReturnTokenMock.sol Lines: 93-95 File: contracts/mocks/tokens/StandardTokenWithFeeMock.sol Lines: 125-131 File: contracts/mocks/tokens/InvalidReturnTokenMock.sol Lines: 115-125 ## Excess Gas Consumption Excess gas consumption may occur when state variables (.balance or .length) are used in the condition of a for or while loop. Every iteration of loop consumes extra gas with these state variables present. In order to mitigate this excess consumption, if .balance, or .length are used several times, holding their value in a local variable is more gas efficient. File: contracts/lib/AddressArrayUtils.sol Lines: 304-308 File: contracts/lib/AddressArrayUtils.sol Lines: 161-166 File: contracts/lib/AddressArrayUtils.sol Lines: 303-309 ile: contracts/lib/AddressArrayUtils.sol Lines: 75-77 File: contracts/lib/AddressArrayUtils.sol Lines: 343-345 File: contracts/lib/AddressArrayUtils.sol Lines: 147-152 File: contracts/lib/AddressArrayUtils.sol Lines: 143-146 File: contracts/lib/AddressArrayUtils.sol Lines: 155-160 File: contracts/lib/AddressArrayUtils.sol Lines: 323-327

File: contracts/core/Vault.sol Lines: 243-251 File: contracts/core/Vault.sol Lines: 282-290 File: contracts/core/Vault.sol Lines: 322-331 File: contracts/core/Vault.sol Lines: 204-212 File: contracts/core/exchange-wrappers/TakerWalletWrapper.sol Lines: 95-109 File: contracts/core/extensions/CoreIssuance.sol Lines: 444-454 File: contracts/core/extensions/CoreIssuance.sol Lines: 394-412 File: contracts/core/extensions/CoreIssuance.sol Lines: 482-484 File: contracts/core/lib/OrderLibrary.sol Lines: 210-221 File: contracts/core/TransferProxy.sol Lines: 115-124 File: contracts/core/RebalancingSetToken.sol Lines: 865-878 File: contracts/core/RebalancingSetToken.sol Lines: 475-522 File: contracts/core/RebalancingSetToken.sol Lines: 763-777 File: contracts/core/SetToken.sol Lines: 109-147 File: contracts/core/modules/IssuanceOrderModule.sol Lines: 641-657 File: contracts/core/modules/IssuanceOrderModule.sol Lines: 321-382 File: contracts/core/modules/IssuanceOrderModule.sol Lines: 611-620 ## Non-initialized Return Values In the case of a non-initialized return value, the default value will be returned (even in the event of failure). If the return value of the function is not required, mitigation should include not specifying return in the function signature. File: contracts/mocks/tokens/StandardTokenWithFeeMock.sol Lines: 102-104 ## Costly Loops If array length is large enough, the function may exceed the block gas limit, and transactions calling it will never be confirmed. This becomes a security issue, if an external entity influences array.length. Relevant mitigation techniques are numerous, but generally involve limitation to a bounded array. File: contracts/lib/AddressArrayUtils.sol Lines: 181-187 File: contracts/lib/AddressArrayUtils.sol Lines: 323-327 File: contracts/lib/AddressArrayUtils.sol Lines: 143-146


File: contracts/lib/AddressArrayUtils.sol Lines: 155-160 File: contracts/lib/AddressArrayUtils.sol Lines: 17-21 File: contracts/lib/AddressArrayUtils.sol Lines: 61-63 File: contracts/lib/AddressArrayUtils.sol Lines: 90-92 File: contracts/lib/AddressArrayUtils.sol Lines: 105-110 File: contracts/lib/AddressArrayUtils.sol Lines: 113-118 File: contracts/lib/AddressArrayUtils.sol Lines: 58-60 File: contracts/lib/AddressArrayUtils.sol Lines: 190-195 File: contracts/lib/AddressArrayUtils.sol Lines: 343-345 File: contracts/lib/AddressArrayUtils.sol Lines: 161-166 File: contracts/lib/AddressArrayUtils.sol Lines: 147-152 File: contracts/lib/AddressArrayUtils.sol Lines: 75-77 File: contracts/lib/Bytes32.sol Lines: 27-27 File: contracts/lib/Bytes32.sol Lines: 32-32 File: contracts/core/Vault.sol Lines: 204-212 File: contracts/core/Vault.sol Lines: 243-251 File: contracts/core/Vault.sol Lines: 322-331 File: contracts/core/Vault.sol Lines: 282-290 File: contracts/core/exchange-wrappers/TakerWalletWrapper.sol Lines: 95-95 File: contracts/core/extensions/CoreIssuance.sol Lines: 394-412 File: contracts/core/extensions/Corelssuance.sol Lines: 482-484 File: contracts/core/extensions/CoreIssuance.sol Lines: 444-454 File: contracts/core/lib/OrderLibrary.sol Lines: 210-221 File: contracts/core/TransferProxy.sol Lines: 115-124 File: contracts/core/RebalancingSetToken.sol Lines: 475-522 File: contracts/core/RebalancingSetToken.sol

Lines: 865-878 File: contracts/core/RebalancingSetToken.sol Lines: 763-777 File: contracts/core/SetToken.sol Lines: 109-147 File: contracts/core/modules/IssuanceOrderModule.sol Lines: 611-620 File: contracts/core/modules/IssuanceOrderModule.sol Lines: 321-321 File: contracts/core/modules/IssuanceOrderModule.sol Lines: 641-657 ## If-Revert Instead of Require Using the construction require(condition); instead of if (condition) {revert();} promotes general code readability. File: contracts/lib/AddressArrayUtils.sol Lines: 242-247 File: contracts/lib/AddressArrayUtils.sol Lines: 270-272 File: contracts/lib/AddressArrayUtils.sol Lines: 289-294 ## Multiple Return Values to Struct Rather than utilizing multiple return values for internal or private functions, a struct may be used. It can improve code readability. File: contracts/lib/AddressArravUtils.sol Line: 38 File: contracts/lib/AddressArrayUtils.sol Line: 15 File: contracts/lib/AddressArrayUtils.sol Line: 220 File: contracts/core/exchange-wrappers/KyberNetworkWrapper.sol Line: 192 File: contracts/core/exchange-wrappers/KyberNetworkWrapper.sol Line: 95 File: contracts/core/exchange-wrappers/KyberNetworkWrapper.sol Line: 128 File: contracts/core/exchange-wrappers/TakerWalletWrapper.sol Line: 78 File: contracts/core/exchange-wrappers/TakerWalletWrapper.sol Line: 133 File: contracts/core/exchange-wrappers/ZeroExExchangeWrapper.sol Line: 181 File: contracts/core/exchange-wrappers/ZeroExExchangeWrapper.sol Line: 102 File: contracts/core/exchange-wrappers/ZeroExExchangeWrapper.sol Line: 261 File: contracts/core/extensions/Corelssuance.sol Line: 389 File: contracts/core/extensions/Corelssuance.sol Lines: 435-438 File: contracts/core/lib/auction-price-libraries/IAuctionPriceCurve.sol Line: 62

File: contracts/core/lib/auction-price-libraries/LinearAuctionPriceCurve.sol Line: 91 File: contracts/core/RebalancingSetToken.sol Line: 405 File: contracts/core/RebalancingSetToken.sol Line: 455 File: contracts/core/RebalancingSetToken.sol Line: 855 File: contracts/core/RebalancingSetToken.sol Line: 944 File: contracts/core/interfaces/IExchangeWrapper.sol Line: 53 File: contracts/mocks/core/exchange-wrappers/lib/ZeroExOrderDataHandlerMock.sol Line: 39 File: contracts/mocks/core/exchange-wrappers/lib/ZeroExOrderDataHandlerMock.sol Line: 21 File: contracts/mocks/core/lib/ConstantAuctionPriceCurve.sol Line: 94 ## Assembly Usage Assembly usage is traditionally cautioned against as it discards several important safety features of Solidity. In each instance found, assembly is only used in order to minimize gas consumption or perform functions otherwise incapable of being performed. File: contracts/lib/ERC20Wrapper.sol Lines: 189-209 File: contracts/core/exchange-wrappers/lib/ZeroExOrderDataHandler.sol Lines: 167-170 File: contracts/core/exchange-wrappers/lib/ZeroExOrderDataHandler.sol Lines: 85-89 File: contracts/core/exchange-wrappers/lib/ZeroExOrderDataHandler.sol Lines: 130-141 File: contracts/core/exchange-wrappers/KyberNetworkWrapper.sol Lines: 264-269 File: contracts/core/exchange-wrappers/TakerWalletWrapper.sol Lines: 140-143 File: contracts/core/lib/ExchangeHeaderLibrary.sol Lines: 64-69 File: contracts/core/lib/EIP712Library.sol Lines: 73-83 File: contracts/core/RebalancingSetTokenFactory.sol Lines: 180-186 File: contracts/external/0x/LibBytes.sol Lines: 49-54 File: contracts/external/0x/LibBytes.sol Lines: 158-186 File: contracts/external/0x/LibBytes.sol Lines: 28-30 File: contracts/external/0x/LibBytes.sol Lines: 102-107 File: contracts/external/0x/LibBytes.sol Lines: 130-156 File: contracts/external/0x/LibBytes.sol

Appendix ## File Directory

Migrations.sol core Core.sol RebalancingSetToken.sol RebalancingSetTokenFactory.sol SetToken.sol SetTokenFactory.sol TransferProxy.sol Vault.sol
exchange-wrappers
KyberNetworkWrapper.sol
ZeroExExchangeWrapper.sol
lib
ZeroExOrderDataHandler.sol
extensions
CoreAccounting.sol
CoreFactory.sol
Corelssuance.sol
CoreModuleInteraction.sol
CoreOperationState.sol
interfaces
ICore.sol
ICorelssuance.sol
IExchangeWrapper.sol
IRebalancingSetToken.sol
ISetFactory.sol
ISetToken.sol
ISignatureValidator.sol
ITransferProxy.sol
L IVault.sol
│
EIP712Library.sol
ExchangeHeaderLibrary.sol
ExchangeWrapperLibrary.sol
OrderLibrary.sol
RebalancingHelperLibrary.sol
SignatureValidator.sol
auction-price-libraries



- CrderLibraryMock.sol
- - RebalanceAuctionModuleMock.sol

– lib

- Bytes32Mock.sol
- CommonMathMock.sol
- ERC20WrapperMock.sol
 TimeLockUpgradeMock.sol
- tokens
 - BadTokenMock.sol
- InvalidReturnTokenMock.sol
- NoDecimalTokenMock.sol
- NoXferReturnTokenMock.sol
- StandardTokenMock.sol
- StandardTokenWithFeeMock.sol